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Abstract 
 
This  paper  attempts  to establish  empirically  the  effects  of  transfers  to  household  on  labour 
productivity  growth.  In  particular,  I  investigate  the  effects  of  health  and  social  security 
expenditure on the rate of growth of GDP per labour units in 19 sectors and 13 OECD countries 
in the period 1976-2000.  
The main result is that transfers such as health expenditure and social security spending have 
positive  and  significant  effects  on  labour  productivity  in  the  sectors  that  require  low  skilled 
workers,  such  as  manufacturing  of  non-durable  goods,  energy  supply,  construction  and 
services. This research shows that these results could be due to a “risk insuring” mechanism: 
employees with low wages (on average low skilled and high labour intensive jobs are less paid 
than high tech ones) find in higher government spending a guarantee of safety and wellbeing, 
otherwise difficult to achieve with their own resources. Moreover the increased security allows 
them to divert resources towards higher saving and investment in education. 
These results are consistent with the assumption that fiscal variables affect growth by means of 
total factor productivity and robust to the test of a possible spurious correlation between public 
transfers and growth, due to openness to trade. 
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The effects of public transfers on productivity 
The  aim  of  this  article  is  to  verify  the  empirical  assessment  of  negative  effects  of  public 
spending on  country’s  growth  and  identify  the main  mechanisms  through  which transfers to 
households can affect sectors’ growth. The main focus here is on health and social security 
expenditure  and,  including  all  the  components  of  the  government  budget  constraint 
(expenditures, taxations and deficit), in compliance to Bleaney, Kneller and Gemmel (1999)’s 
statement  (in  investigating  the  effects  of  fiscal  variables  on  the  economic  performance,  the 
estimated coefficients are highly affected by the relation between revenues and expenditure 
variables and, in order to avoid a misspecification of the public budget constraint), empirical 
analysis have to include all the constraint’s variables, except one to avoid perfect collinearity. I 
conduct  my  analysis  by  sector.  The  main  result  is  the  being  of  a  positive  and  significant 
correlation  between  transfers  and  labour productivity  growth  in  low-income  sectors,  such as 
agriculture,  non-durables,  construction  and  services.  Public  health  expenditure  and  welfare 
programmes are found to benefit workers in low wages sectors because they create a more 
protected environment, mitigate risks, boost labour productivity and lead to higher output and 
wages; the consequent increase in disposable income lowers domestic liquidity constraints and 
allow agents to move resources towards more productive uses such as higher savings and 
investments in education.  
Historically, albeit different extent, a country’s industrialisation has typically been accompanied 
by  an  increase  in  the  size  of  its  welfare  state.  But,  if  during  the  height  of  the  Keynesian 
consensus social transfers programmes were seen as complementary to demand management 
policies, in the 1960s and 1970s, during the dark periods of stagflation following the first oil 
crisis, government were perceived as failing to stabilise the economy and to redistribute income 
effectively, and still nowadays, in a world characterised by increasing degrees of international 
economic  integration,  where  governments  perceive  themselves  as  competing  against  each 
other in the attempt to attract and/or retain increasingly mobile firms, most industrial economies 
strive  to  roll-back  the  welfare  state, as precondition for  successful competition  in  the  global 
economy.  
Taking a closer look to the trend of the level of social security transfers and health expenditure 
as  a  percentage  of  GDP  in  the  last  decades  in  the  13  OECD  countries  considered  in  my 
analysis, it is interesting to notice the different movements of these fiscal variables by country 
group.  The  Scandinavian  “Big  Spenders”,  such  as  Finland,  Norway  and  Sweden,  have 
considerably increased the share of welfare spending up to 1993 – reaching almost 25% of 
GDP; it is at the beginning of the 90s, however, that their welfare states came under severe 
pressure with the deepest recession since the 30s – especially in Sweden where both fiscal   4 
deficit and expenditure rose considerably
1. In the same time span, countries as Austria, Italy, 
Netherlands and UK reached the peak level of social security expenditure in the mid 80s and 
since then they have slowly started to reduce the size of their welfare state in order to lower 
distortions  in  the  labour  market  and  increase  global  competitiveness.  The  share  of  health 
expenditure  on  GDP  has,  instead,  been  quite  constant  in  the  last  25  years  in  most  of  the 
industrialised  countries  between  1%  and  6%,  exceptions  are  represented  by  countries  like 
Canada  and  Denmark,  which  have  sensed  the  importance  of  investment  in  public  health 
services and research and have increased health expenditure to 12% and 19% respectively. 
Investigating in better details, the historical trend of the relation between the level of GDP and 
the level of transfer (welfare and health) in the period 1976-2000 in the 13 countries studied 
contradicts  what  is  commonly  believed  in  policy  circles
2  and  it  confirms  the  evidence  of  a 
positive relationship between welfare spending and economic performance.  
This surely challenges most policy decisions of cutting spending in the so-called unproductive 
voices of budget constraint spending in order to higher productivity, based on the belief that 
government  spending  reduces  labour-force  participation  by  creating  disincentives  to  work, 
reduces  productivity  growth  rates by  inhibiting  innovation and  capital  accumulation,  reduces 
productivity as resources are withdrawn from the private sector and placed in the unproductive 
public sector and increases interest rates which decrease private investment. 
The picture emerging from the current state of both the theoretical and the empirical literature 
on these issues is quite contradictory. On a theoretical ground, whilst some authors highlight the 
positive effects of welfare state on a country’s economic performance due either to the role of 
public sector as risk insurer (Sinn, 1995; Rodrik, 1997 and 1998; Wildasin, 1995); to its effects 
on a country’s real income and competitiveness (Molana and Montagna 2002; Atkinson, 1998; 
Devereux, Head and Lapham, 1996), and to the positive effects of social security transfers on 
relaxation  of  family’s  liquidity  constraints  enhancing,  therefore,  physical  and  human  capital 
accumulation (Jappelli and Pagano, 1994). Others focus on the distortionary effects of public 
expenditure and taxation, harmful for competitiveness (Alesina and Perotti, 1997). Results are 
mixed at the empirical level, as well: some authors identify no significant relationship between 
WS spending and the rate of growth (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Mandoza, Milesi-Ferretti and 
Asea, 1997), while other find either a significant positive (Korpi, 1985; McCallum and Blais, 
1987;  Castles  and  Dorwick,  1990;  Sala-i-Martin,  1992)  or  negative  relation  between  the 
variables  (Barro,  1991;  Weede,  1991;  Engen  and  Skinner,  1992;  Hansson  and  Henrekson, 
1994; Grier, 1999; Fölster and Henrekson, 2001). The reasons for such discrepancy can be 
                                                 
1 Lately the authorities’ efforts to restore policy credibility, through a strong program of fiscal consolidation and by 
pursuing price stability in an inflation targeting framework, have been highly successful and the potential output in 
Sweden has grown at an estimated annual rate of 2.5% in recent years compared with 1.5% in the first half of the 
1990s. 
2 The common belief is the existence of a trade off between the achievement of each state’s aim of supporting living 
standard through poverty relief, guarantee of economic security and reduction of inequality and a country’s growth.   5 
often  found  in  the  different  starting  point  and  theoretical  frameworks  of  reference:  if  Sala-i-
Martin (1992) asserts that higher transfers encourage the older generations to retire and give 
space to more productive young workers and, therefore, they are considered growth-enhancing 
leave the labour market and allow younger, other authors highlight different “transmission-gear” 
such as the years of democracy, political participation and income inequality at the beginning of 
the period. Therefore, conclusions cannot be unequivocal and they most likely depend on the 
number of countries studied, the time span considered and the frame of reference. 
Regarding the role played by health expenditure, recent developments of growth studies have 
focused on the role played by workers’ health conditions as one of the main variables that affect 
human  capital,  given  that  healthier  workers  are  proven  to  be  physically  and  mentally  more 
energetic  and  robust  (Bloom,  Canning  and  Sevilla,  2001).  However  most  of  the  existing 
literature on these topics has focused on developing countries. A healthy population is believed 
to be an engine for economic growth through a number of different channels, which have been 
identified in many works concerning economic growth in developing countries:  (1) first of all, 
healthier workers are more robust and less likely to be absent from work and many authors 
have shown how this positively affects earning and productivity (Knaul, 1999; Ribero, 1999; 
Savedoff and Schultz, 2000); (2) moreover a better health contributes to alter expenditure and 
savings  decisions  over  the  life  cycle,  because  a  reduced  mortality  rate  leads  to  longer  life 
expectation  and  consequent  retirement  planning  and  saving;  (3)  the  fall  in  fertility  due  to 
improved health conditions induces investments in education at higher levels and increased 
rates  of  school  attendance  (Bhargava,  2001);  finally  (4)  another  channel  is  by  encouraging 
foreign  direct  investments  because  healthier  populations  can  offer  to  external  investors  a 
stronger labour market. 
Although  these  elements  seem  to  be  mostly  relevant  in  the  first  stages  of  a  country’s 
development,  which  has  led  to  scarce  analysis  of  the  effects  of  healthier  population  in 
developed countries in contrast to a great deal of works on low and middle-income ones, we 
can not state that health expenditure does not have any effect on productivity at later stages of 
a country’s development.  
 
Explaining  these evidences  is  the  aim of  this  research:  is  the  relation between households’ 
transfers  (sickness  and  disability,  old  age,  survivors,  family  and  children,  unemployment, 
housing, social exclusion, medical products, hospital services, public health services) and GDP 
significant? Which mechanisms can justify the higher productivity due to higher expenses? Is 
this relation causal or spurious and due to a third variable possibly related both to GDP and 
transfers? 
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1.  The basic model.  
The  thesis  aims  to  highlight  the  role  of  different  components  of  government  expenditure  in 
determining a country’s growth. It is now necessary to show the real focus of my work and the 
reasons why I took into account certain variables instead of others. 
I assume that each sector has a simple production function, in the Cobb-Douglas form 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1
t t t t L K A Y                   [1] 
where t is time, Y is net output (or value added), K is capital, L is labour, A represents TFP
3, and 
￿ and 1-￿ represent the return to capital and labour respectively.  
Taking the production function in terms of labour productivity, I examine the determinants of 
growth between t-1 and t  and I obtain 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Ak k k A k A y ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
1  
Letting a 
￿ on a variable denote its proportional rate of growth  
  k A y ˆ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
                    [2] 
I assume that 
￿
A is affected by government expenditure as follows 
d t g A ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 2 1 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
                [3] 
which postulates that the growth rate of TFP depends on the variation of public expenditure,  g ￿ , 
on the variation of the level of taxation, t￿, and on the variation of the country’s deficit, d ￿ . 
This choice is due to the fact that in investigating the effects of fiscal variables on the economic 
performance, the estimated coefficients are highly affected by the relation between revenues 
and  expenditure  variables  and,  in  order  to  avoid  a  misspecification  of  the  public  budget 
constraint, empirical analyses have to include all the constraint’s variables.
4 In details, to avoid 
perfect collinearity between the variables I have to omit one of the constraint variables: in this 
case, basing the choice on the mainstream theories and on my own tests, Taxes on goods and 
services can be considered ‘neutral’ for the regression equation (t4 is omitted). 
 
Substituting [3] in [2], I have     
                                                 
3 TFP is commonly defined as a ratio of a volume measure of output to a volume measure of input use; there are 
many  different  productivity  measures  of  productivity;  the  choice  between  them  depends  on  the  purpose  of  the 
measurement  and,  in  many  instances,  on  the  availability  of  data.  This  work  will  concentrate  on  a  multifactor 
productivity measure based on a value-added concept of output. 
4 According to Bleany, Gemmell and Kneller (1999) those previous works that investigated the  effects of either 
expenditure, taxation or deficit on growth have all led to incomplete results.   7 
u k d t g y ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ˆ ˆ 4 3 2 1 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿              [4] 
where ￿s are constant parameters – which depend on ￿, 1-￿, ￿o, ￿1,  ￿2, ￿3– and the last term 
embodies any omissions and approximations introduced above. On the assumption that the 
latter is a well-behaved random disturbance term, I can estimate the former parameters using 
data from a representative sample of industries in a number of countries.  
What I want to establish is how fiscal variables’ variations affect the rate of growth of labour 
productivity in each of the 19 sectors for which data are available and it is by means of panel 
data analysis that I can investigate both spatial and temporal dimensions, considering 5-years 
average rates of growth and variations in 13 OECD countries. Fixed effects–within panel model 
is the best suited for my purpose: it presents constant slopes but different intercepts according 
to time and it has not significant country differences. 
Therefore the basic regression that I will run for each sector will be 
  it it it it u X y ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ˆ                   [5] 
in which the rate of growth of labour productivity ( t ij y , ˆ  represent value added per employee) is a 
function of a vector including the rate of growth of capital per labour unit and the variation of a 
set of fiscal variables 
  ) , , , , , , , , , , , , ˆ ( , 3 , 2 , 1 , 8 , 7 , 6 , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 it it it it it it it it it it it it it it d t t t g g g g g g g g k X X ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   [6] 
The peculiarity of fixed effects panel methods is the relevance of the constant term which, in this 
case, captures the fixed effects of different time periods t and different countries i. 
  t i it ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿                     [7] 
As a result the complete form of my regression will be 
 
it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it t i it
u d t t t g g g
g g g g g k y
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
13 , 3 12 , 2 11 , 1 10 , 8 9 , 7 8 , 6 7
, 5 6 , 4 5 , 3 4 , 2 3 , 1 2 1 ˆ ˆ
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
    [8] 
and the time and country’s fixed effects  t ￿  and  i ￿  will be captured by specific time and country 
dummies. 
 
2.  Results. 
In this section the results for my regressions are presented. First I investigate the effects of 
fiscal variables’ variation on the rate of growth of labour productivity, focusing on the role played 
by  household  transfers;  afterwards  I  verify  whether  the  causal  relation  highlighted  in  the 
previous steps could be spurious and affected by a third variable related both to productivity   8 
growth and fiscal variations: as control variables I consider a country’s openness to trade and 
the variation of its expenditure in R&D. 
According  to  the  mainstream theory on  the  relation between  public  spending  and  economic 
performance  I  would  expect  the  results  to  show  positive  effects  of  the  fiscal  variables  that 
should  lead  to  higher  productivity,  such  as  public  services  expenditure  (g3),  education 
expenditure (g5) and housing and community expenditure (g8); on the contrary social security 
transfers (g7) are generally classified as unproductive expenditures and thought to be growth 
impeding, at the same way all kinds of taxation and public deficit are expected to have negative 
coefficients.  Moreover I presume that educational expenditure will have more significant effects 
on labour productivity in those sectors that require high skilled workers, like manufacturing of 
durable goods, while health expenditure should positively affects low skilled labour-intensive 
sectors (non-durables, construction and partly services).  
This is not verified in my research: the chief achievement of my investigation is the significant 
positive coefficient of health and welfare expenditure in manufacturing of non-durable goods, 
energy supply, construction and service sectors, robust to the inclusion of all fiscal variables 
and a measure of openness to trade and expenditure in R&D as control variables.  
 
2.1.  Transfers’ variation and growth of labour productivity. 
In first instance I regress equation [8] for each of the 19 sectors and the results are reported in 
Table 1. The dependent variable in the specified equation is the 5-years rate of growth of labour 
productivity in the sub-periods 1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, and 1996-2000, by sector 
in 13 OECD countries. 
   9 
Table 1. Effects of fiscal variables’ variation on the rate of growth of labour productivity (GDP per labour units) in 19 sectors. 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿   ! """￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿# $ ￿ ""￿ ￿￿! ! % """￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿# # ￿""￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿$ ""￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿ & ""￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿! # ) "￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
, ￿ ￿ ￿￿- ￿ ￿￿% ) % """￿￿￿. $ ￿""￿￿￿  . # """￿￿￿  ) % """￿ ￿￿  % ! """￿ ￿￿. % ! ""￿￿￿. &   """￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿. ￿$ "￿ ￿￿) ) % ""￿￿￿$ ! # ""￿￿￿) $ & """￿￿￿￿   & ""￿￿￿) ￿% ""￿￿￿! . . ""￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ . # """￿￿￿! % & """￿￿￿￿ ! ￿""￿ ￿￿$ % ! """￿ ￿￿! ) ￿ """￿ ￿￿￿ & ￿""￿￿￿! ￿ ) """￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿$ ! ) ""￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿# & & "￿ ￿￿￿ # % ""￿ ￿￿# % $ "￿ ￿￿# . ! ""￿￿￿￿ ￿& ""￿￿￿#   ) ""￿
, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ( ( ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿) & . "￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿& . ) """￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿. ￿% "￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ )   ""￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
2 ￿ 1 ￿￿ ￿ ￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿!   % ""￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  & $ """￿￿￿￿) $ & """￿￿￿￿) ) ￿""￿￿￿￿! & ￿""￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  % . """￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ % "￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ # ! ""￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿! &   ""￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ! % ""￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿. ! . ""￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ $ $ ""￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
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￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ $ # """￿￿￿￿ $ ￿""￿ ￿￿# !   "￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ! ￿""￿ ￿￿￿ ! & ""￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ . . """￿ ￿￿￿ # $ "￿ ￿￿￿ & & ""￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿# % $ ""￿￿￿# . ￿""￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿# $ $ ""￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿# $ & ""￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ $ . """￿ ￿￿# $ ! "￿ ￿￿# ￿ $ "￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿# $ $ ""￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿# # % ""￿￿￿# ! ￿"￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿# ) ￿""￿￿￿￿￿ %   ""￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿# . % ""￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿# $ ) "￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ) ) ""￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ $ . ""￿ ￿￿$ ￿# ""￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ $ ! ""￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿! ) & """￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿$ # . ""￿ ￿￿$ ￿  """￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿! ) . """￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ & % """￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿# . & "￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿""￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿! )   "￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
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Notes: The dependent variable is the rate of growth of labour productivity. *=10%level of significance, **=5%level of significance, ***=1% level of significance 
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As  highlighted  the  variables  regarding  pensions,  health  expenditure,  family  benefits, 
unemployment  benefits,  poverty  alleviation,  income  replacement  programs,  sickness  pay 
occupational illness and disability (belonging to the variables Health and Social Secuirty) have 
positive and significant effects on the rate of growth of labour productivity in the labour-intensive 
sectors (agriculture, non-durables manufacturing, constructions and services).   
Coefficients are partly different from the expected ones: if taxation and deficit variables have 
significant negative effects  on  the  rate of growth  of  GDP,  the unproductive  voice of budget 
constraint represented by the social security transfers seems to enhance a country’s growth, 
education expenditure, believed to boost labour productivity, appears not significant in any of 
the  specifications  and  health  expenditure  has  a  positive  and  significant  coefficient  in  non-
durables manufacturing, energy, construction and services. 
In  better  details,  I  am  interested  to  investigate  the  mechanisms  that  lead  higher  labour 
productivity as effect of higher Health and Welfare Expenditure. The first question I will try to 
answer is why these mechanisms seem to be in action in certain sectors and not in others? 
Three could be the possible explanations: (1) higher transfers in the form of pension are an 
incentive for older workers to retire allowing younger and more productive workers to enter the 
labour  market,  in accordance  with  Sala-i-Martin  (1992)’s  theory;  (2)  transfers  in  the form  of 
unemployment  benefit  and  universalistic  health  expenditure  permit  to  low-wage  workers  to 
warrant  against  the  risk  of  sickness,  disability,  poverty  and  job  loss;  and  (3)  the  increased 
disposable income due to transfers allow families to divert resources towards higher saving and 
investments, especially in human capital. 
If the first of the three could be considered quite general and less helpful in explaining the 
different  effects  of  transfers  by  sector  (manufacturing  of  durables  and  non  durables  in 
particular), the last two are more likely to shed light on the different results shown in table 1. 
First of all it is useful to point up the different role of the welfare state: on one side it satisfies a 
need for social insurance against unemployment, sickness, disability and poverty, and on the 
other it has a redistributive function that aims at the reduction of inequalities. 
The  analysis  by  sector  allow  me  to  distinguish  the  effects  of  social  policies  on  workers 
according to their wage level, and it shows that low-skilled and low-wage workers benefit more 
from public transfers in terms of productivity. These findings are in agreement with the idea, 
stressed first by Persson and Tabellini (1994) and empirically tested more recently by Moene 
and Wallerstein (2003), that the role played by welfare state changes with different levels of 
percapita income and different degrees of inequality: more equal countries, as those analysed 
in this paper, are more likely to activate social insurance policies instead of redistributive ones, 
and respond to the social need for insurance of low-wage workers with universalistic plans and 
not for employed only – quite relevant in this matter is the amount of health expenditure.   
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The results could therefore be due to the insurance effect that allows low-skilled workers to feel 
more secure on the job, both against the risk of sickness and disability (positive effects of health 
expenditure on labour productivity) and in case of job loss (positive effects of social security 
transfers,  including  unemployment  benefit,  on  the  rate  of  growth  of  labour  productivity); 
moreover, the insurance effect is a natural consequence of the higher income level existing in 
industrialised countries and the peculiar social insurance policies, that reduce uncertainty for all. 
In accordance with Rodrick (1997) and Sinn (1995) workers in manufacturing of non-durables 
goods and in services perceive the government action as an insuring mechanism against risks, 
and  the  knowledge  and  feeling  of  higher  transfers  reduces  the  need  for  private  insurance. 
Social  insurance  guarantees  a  certain  level  of  protection  and  allows  low-wage  workers  to 
engage  in  risky  and  profitable  activities  which  they  otherwise  would  not  have  dared  to 
undertake, and leads to increased saving and investment in human capital. 
These results are coherent with most of the findings in risk-taking theory.  Beyond Sinn (1995) 
since Domar and Musgrave contribution: if losses are compensated by the system, the agents 
risk taking increases and in a number of markets, in which the internal insuring mechanisms fail, 
public  intervention  is essential for the  market’s efficiency.  The  mechanism  in  action  in  non-
durables production sectors represents, in my point of view, a virtuous circle of growth: public 
transfers, like public health services and welfare programmes, benefit workers in low wages 
sectors  by  mitigating  the  risks  and  increasing  their  disposable  income.  A  more  protected 
environment  boosts  labour  productivity  and  leads  to  higher  output  and  wages.  A  higher 
disposable income lowers domestic liquidity constraints and moves resources towards more 
productive uses such as higher savings and investments in education.  
Therefore  the  positive  effects  of  transfers  are  two:  (1)  higher  productivity  due  to  increased 
protection  and  (2)  positive  effects  of  social  insurance  on  investments  and,  consequently, 
improved investments in human capital. If the first of the two crashed with most of the theory on 
opportunistic  behaviour,  the  second  raise  doubt  on  the  results  concerning  expenditure  in 
education in Table 1.  
Most  of  the  literature  on  incentive  and  motivation  in  labour  market  highlights  how  more 
protected and secure worker are more likely to adopt opportunistic behaviour that reduce their 
productivity. However, such behaviours occur once a certain level of security has been reached, 
and it is mostly related to lack of monitoring at firm level. The increased safety in the labour 
market  due  to  transfers  is  coherent  with  increases  in  labour  productivity  as  long  as  the 
monitoring procedures are in place and work efficiently, the worker, insured against job loss and 
disability, will not engage in free riding action if this could be punished in some way by the 
employer.   
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Moreover this article does not aim to state which is the optimal amount of welfare expenditure, 
but it simply wants to shed light on the importance of well-oriented public policies on the rate of 
growth in certain sectors. Although an excessive degree of protection and security could cause 
free riding and reduce productivity, policies targeted to low-wage and low-skilled workers could 
be a useful implement to improve efficiency in labour intensive sectors, to increase disposable 
income and relax the liquidity constraints of families.  
Having a closer look at the coefficients of the expenditure in education (Table 1), it is clear that 
the fact that they are not significant in any of the sectors taken into account is in contrast with 
my hypothesis that higher transfers relax the liquidity constraints and allow families to invest 
more in human capital, therefore increasing labor productivity. If this were the case I would 
expect positive effects of direct expenditure in education (row 5 in Table 1) as well as positive 
effects of the indirect one due to relaxation of the liquidity constraints. The decision on whether 
to continue study and the amount of income spent for education is, for any family, a direct 
function of the disposable income and the borrowing constraint existing on the financial market 
and  this  is  why  public  transfers  can  loosen  up  the  constraints  and  enlarge  the  disposable 
income, leading families to greater spending in education.   
This discrepancy between direct and indirect effects of expenditure in education on productivity 
is in line with the discrepancy between the effects of investment in general and specific human 
capital  on  labor  productivity.  In  1964  the  Nobel  prize  Gary  Becker  introduce  the  so-called 
human  capital  earning  function  and  shows  the  importance  of  investing,  not  only  in  general 
human  capital,  but  mostly  in  specific  on  the  job  training.  The  author  writes  “schooling,  a 
computer  training  course,  expenditures  of  medical  care,  and  lectures  on  the  virtues  of 
punctuality and honesty also are capital […] because they raise earnings, improve health, or 
add to a person' s good habits over much of his lifetime” and stresses the importance of on the 
job training to affect labour productivity and to determine the majority of wage differentials due 
to greater experience. This confirms, moreover, the role of general education (represented in 
our analysis by the voice of expenditure in education of the budget constraint) as a signal in the 
labour market, instead of being an indicator of productivity, which justify the results in Table 1; 
the expenditure in education financed by the state is mainly targeted to general education, with 
little evidence for sizeable external returns (Acemoglu 2000 e 2001) and high internalization of 
its  effects  as  signal  for  the  employer;  on  the  contrary  low-skilled  workers  divert  the  higher 
available resources towards more specific education and on the job training, that increases their 
productivity. 
  
At  this  point,  it  is  useful  to  spend  some  words  on  the  control  variables  included  and  their 
coefficients (see Table 1): if the three taxation variables are, as expected, negatively related to  
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labour growth, the not significant coefficient of expenditure in education is quite surprising given 
the vast amount of research on the positive role of education in boosting accumulation of skills 
and  better  technology,  increasing  labour  productivity  and  a  country’s  ability  to  absorb 
technology from abroad, and consequently leading to higher growth. The coefficient of deficit is 
negative but not very significant in most of the sectors, as anticipated. The other expenditure 
variables included do not present significant coefficients in nearly all cases. 
Finally the inclusion of time and country dummies guarantees that either country or time specific 
effects do not affect the results. The significance of the time dummy in the period 1981-85 is 
most likely due to the evident raise of the share of transfers on GDP in most of the countries in 
that period: in particular countries like Canada, Denmark, France, Italy and the Netherlands 
have constantly increased their social spending until 1987, up to 15-20% of GDP. Not to forget 
the great debate of those years on the negative effects of social expenditure on public deficit, 
with the election of Margaret Thatcher in UK in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in the US in 1980, 
both carrying on very critical positions towards the reasons of the growing deficits. 
What  is  more  is  that  countries as  Finland,  Italy,  Sweden  and  United Kingdom  present  very 
significant positive coefficients in their dummies. This results could surely be expected for the 
Scandinavian countries: the Swedish model can, in fact, be seen as an ideal form of ' welfare 
state' , offering institutional care in the sense that it offers universal minima to its citizens and it 
goes further than the British model in its commitment to social equality. The model of Nordic 
countries is the ' solidaristic wage policy'  advocated by the labour movement, which emphasised 
improving  standards,  limited  differentials,  and  redistribution.  While  in  the  United  Kingdom 
coverage is extensive, but benefits and services are delivered at a low level. 
 
2.2.  Openness and R&D expenditure as control variables. 
The previous paragraphs lead to the conclusion of a causal relationship between government 
size  and  growth,  but  it  could  be  argued  that  they  both  may  depend  on  a  third  variable 
independently and the direct statistical correlation between them may happen to be spurious. 
Hence  I  added  two  control  variables  to  investigate  whether  there  is  a  casual  relationship 
between government size and growth or not: openness and expenditure in R&D.  
Growth  and  transfers  may,  in  fact,  both  depend  on  openness  independently  and  the  direct 
statistical correlation between them may happen to be spurious. So, for instance, exposure to 
trade could affect growth-affecting productivity of firms and industries; at the same time, it could 
also increase the scope for an active role of the state as a provider of social insurance, by 
increasing the volatility of the economic environment (e.g. Rodrik, 1998). Larger trade implies 
greater  openness  that  facilitates  the  economy’s  adoption  of  more  efficient  techniques  of  
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production, leading to faster growth of TFP and, hence, real per capita income. At the same way 
greater openness increases external risks and leads to higher volatility in domestic income and 
consumption, hence calling for a risk-reducing role of government spending. 
I  have  therefore  included  the  five-years  variation  of  the  ratio  of  trade  (sum  of  imports  and 
exports) to GDP as a control variable. Results are shown in Table 2: the variation of the ratio of 
trade on GDP is not significant in any of the sectors. This confirms the robustness of previous 
results and shows that the correlation between public spending and growth does not arise from 
the omission of other explanatory variables. There is no evidence of spurious correlation: health 
and social security variables remain statistically significant with positive coefficients.
5 
 
Table 2. Effects of fiscal variables’ variation on the rate of growth of labour productivity 
(GDP per labour units), including OPENNESS as a control variable. 
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿ $ "￿ ￿￿￿ $ ) ""￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿#   $ ""￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ . ! ""￿ ￿￿￿ $ % ""￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Notes: The dependent variable is the rate of growth of labour productivity. *=10%level of significance, **=5%level of 
significance, ***=1% level of significance. 
 
A further control variable that I have introduced in my analysis to double check the robustness 
of  the  results  is  a  measure  of  Research  and  Development  Expenditure,  from  ANBERD 
                                                 
5 As an auxiliary piece of evidence I add two interactive terms Openness*Health and Openness*Welfare, calculated 
as the product of the openness variable explained above and, respectively, the variation of the share of health and 
welfare expenditure on GDP. This helps me to investigate whether the rate of growth of labour productivity is a 
positive function of transfers to household only in those countries and sectors more open to trade and exposed to an 
higher amount of risk, or not. All specifications validate my hypothesis: it is not the degree of openness that leads to 
higher demand for public transfers but the risk, uncertainty and insecurity connected with the lower wages paid in 
certain  sectors.  Therefore  the  positive  effects  of  domestic  transfers  are  strictly  associated  to the  sectors  of the 
economy. As a matter of fact, the coefficients of the interacted terms Openness*Health and Openness*Welfare are 
not significant in any specifications, while the effects of transfers to households remain positively significant in the 
sectors producing non-durable goods and in services and not significant in the sector producing durable goods. This 
is a further support of the conclusion that the correlation between public spending and growth does not arise from the 
omission of other explanatory variables, and the effects of health and social security expenditure are independent 
from the degree of openness to trade.  
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(Analytical Business Enterprise Research and Development) database
6, calculated as the five-
years variation of the share R&D expenditure on GDP, in six non-durable goods sectors, five 
durable goods sectors, energy gas and water supply, construction and three service sectors.  
The choice of this variable is mainly due to the measureless literature on the role played by the 
amount of expenditure in increasing a country’s productivity, independently of the addition of 
other explanatory variables. The rate of growth of labour productivity has always been seen as 
a positive function of a country’s spending in Research and development, especially in high-
technology sectors.   
The  results  in  Table  3  confirm  that  the  effects  of  R&D  on  labour  productivity  in  sectors 
producing durable goods are positive, but not significant in this analysis; while the effects in 
services and manufacturing of non-durables, albeit still not significant, are negative. However, 
Table 3 does not strengthen the achievement of the basic investigation: although still positive in 
manufacturing of non-durable goods and service sectors and negative in the sectors producing 
durable goods, the effects of a variation in health expenditure on the rate of growth of labour 
productivity are not as significant as in the specification without the variable accounting for R&D 
expenditure. The same holds for a variation of the share of social security expenditure on GDP.  
This  research  has  proven  that  a  deeper  investigation  on  the  role  of  public  intervention  in 
different  sectors  of  the  economy  can  shed  new  light  on  the  importance  of  transfers  to 
households in improving labour productivity. 
                                                 
6 The ANBERD (Analytical Business Enterprise Research and Development) database was developed to provide a 
consistent data set that overcomes the problems of international comparability and breaks in the time series of the 
official business enterprise R&D provided to the OECD by its Member countries through the OECD' s R&D survey. 
Through the use of established estimation techniques, the OECD Secretariat has created a database for 19 of the 
largest R&D performing countries, as well as a zone total for the European Union. The database is designed to 
provide analysts with comprehensive and internationally comparable time-series on industrial R&D expenditures.  
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Table 3. Effects of fiscal variables’ variation on the rate of growth of labour productivity (GDP per labour units), including 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT Expenditure as a control variable. 
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Notes: The dependent variable is the rate of growth of labour productivity. *=10%level of significance, **=5% level of significance, ***=1% level of significance.  
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The  government  is  called  to  actively  redistribute  revenues  towards  health  expenditure  and 
social  security  programmes  because  these  voices  of  the  budget  constraint  have  positive 
correlation with the rate of growth of labour productivity; by doing so, the public sector would 
allow workers to divert resources towards higher investments in education and grater saving. 
However it is not clear to what extend the government should boost welfare spending, given 
that  an  excessive  protection  in  low-income  sectors  could  lower  productivity,  it  has  been 
demonstrated  that  policies  aimed  towards  less  protected  workers,  either  through  direct 
strategies or by considering the wage level as an indicator of safety of the working environment, 
could be a useful tool to raise efficiency in labour-intensive sectors, improve workers situation, 
increase households’ disposable income and relax liquidity constraint. 
 
3.  Conclusions. 
This  paper  attempts  to  prove  empirically  the  effects  of  public  transfers  to  households  on  a 
country’s economic performance,  and  in  details on  labour  productivity,  investigating the  role 
played by welfare transfers and health expenditure on productivity growth in the last decades. 
The central aspects of this analysis are: the approach by sectors of the economy in order to 
verify  which  sectors  are  more  affected  by  social  policies;  and  the  assumption  that  public 
transfers affect the rate of growth of GDP per employee by means of total factor productivity, 
including a measure of TFP based on data on human and physical capital and labour, instead of 
proxing TFP by labour productivity. 
The cross-country panel analysis concerning the period 1976-2000 shows that the sectors most 
affected by changes in domestic transfers are: agriculture, manufacturing of non-durable goods, 
energy supply, construction and services. These results are robust to the inclusion of all fiscal 
variables as control variables. The reason for such results can be found in the risk- reducing 
role played by the public sector in the sectors with lower wages and more physical work. Two 
are the mechanisms in action. First, spending in health and social security lowers the risks of 
unemployment and leads to a safer working environment for workers in low wages sectors. The 
higher protection enhances efficiency and labour productivity, boosting by consequence output 
and  wages.  Second,  transfers  to  households  lower  domestic  liquidity  constraints  raise 
disposable income and allows family to move resources towards more productive uses such as 
higher savings and investments in education.  
Finally, I have introduced a measure of openness and the amounts of R&D expenditure in each 
sector to double check my previous results.  
Testing the possibility of a spurious correlation between government size and growth due to 
their correlation with a measure of openness to trade, my results seem to be robust: there is no  
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evidence of spurious correlation and the coefficient of government spending remains statistically 
significant.  At  last,  once  I  include  a  measure  of  Research  and  Development  Expenditure, 
unfortunately, the accomplishment of the basic investigation are not strengthened. Although still 
positive in manufacturing of non-durable goods and service sectors and negative in the sectors 
producing durable goods, the effects of a variation in domestic transfers on the rate of growth of 
labour productivity are not as significant as in the specification without the variable accounting 
for R&D expenditure.   
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Appendix. Data analysis. 
All data concerning production, value added, labour compensation of employees, total employment and 
gross fixed capital formation come from the 2002 versions of STAN Industrial Database. 
The  study  covers  19  sectors  of  the  economy:  Agriculture,  hunting,  forestry  and  fishing  (S1),  Food 
products, beverages and tobacco (S2), Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear (S3), Wood and 
products of wood and cork (S4), Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing (S5), Chemical, 
rubber, plastics and fuel products (S6), Other non-metallic mineral products (S7), Basic metals, metal 
products, machinery and equipment (S8), Basic metals and fabricated metal products (S9), Machinery 
and equipment (S10), Transport equipment (S11), Manufacturing nec (S12), Electricity, gas and water 
supply (S13), Construction (S14), Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels (S15), Transport, 
storage  and  communication  (S16),  Finance,  insurance,  real  estate  and  business  services  (S17), 
Community social and personal services (S18), Business sector services (S19).  
And  13  OECD  countries:  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States during the period 1976- 2000. 
All  the  data  have  been  deflated  using  OECD  Historical  series  of  PPPs  for  GDP  in  order  to  have 
comparable measures. The OECD estimates are defined as the ratio of PPS for private final consumption 
expenditure to exchange rates; the OECD Historical series of PPPs for GDP are defined in terms of US 
dollars, hence the data used in my regression are all in terms of US dollars. 
Government  expenditure  data  comes  from  Government  Finance  Statistics-IMF.  The  government 
spending variables that I considered to be of interest are defined as follows:  
￿  Government Investment (g1): gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP. 
￿  General  Public  Services  Expenditure  (g2):  including  executive  and  legislative  organs,  foreign 
economic  aid,  general  services,  basic  R&D,  public  debt  transactions,  transfers  of  general 
character between different levels of government (share of GDP). 
￿  Defense  Expenditure  (g3):  including  military  defense,  civil  defense,  foreign  military  air,  R&D 
defense (share of GDP). 
￿  Education Expenditure (g4): including pre-primary and primary education, secondary education, 
post secondary education, tertiary education, education not definable by level, subsidiary services 
to education, R&D education (share of GDP). 
￿  Health  Expenditure  (g5):  including  medical  products,  appliances  and  equipment,  outpatient 
services, hospital services, public health services, R&D health (share of GDP). 
￿  Social  Security  and  Welfare  Expenditure  (g6):  including  sickness  and  disability,  old  age, 
survivors, family and children, unemployment, housing, social exclusion, R&D social protection 
(share of GDP). 
￿  Housing and Community Amenities Expenditure (g7): including housing development, community 
development,  water  supply,  street  lighting,  R&D  housing  and  community  amenities  (share  of 
GDP). 
￿  Residual Expenditure (g8). 
Government revenue data comes from Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries, and are defined 
as follows: 
￿  Tax on Income and Profits as a share of GDP. 
￿  Social Security Contributions as a share of GDP. 
￿  Taxes on Property as a share of GDP. 
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